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ABSTRACT
The robust development of Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
causes a significant growth in sharing EHRs for clinical re-
search. However, such a sharing makes it difficult to protect
patients’ privacy. A number of automated de-identification
tools have been developed to reduce the re-identification risk
of published data, while preserving its statistical meanings.
In this paper, we focus on the experimental evaluation of
existing automated de-identification tools, as applied to our
EHR database, to assess which tool performs better with
each quasi-identifiers defined in our paper. Performance of
each tool is analyzed wrt. two aspects: individual disclosure
risk and information loss. Through this experiment, the gen-
eralization method has better performance on reducing risk
and lower degree of information loss than suppression, which
validates it as more appropriate de-identification technique
for EHR databases.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of effective health care, sharing patient’s
EHR is one of the trends empowering modern health infor-
mation systems (HIS); and with standardized EHR speci-
fications like HL7 and openEHR[5], sharable EHR system
is at the edge of practice. Huge amounts of patients’ EHRs
would then be used by numerous clinical researchers and on-
line diagnosis services. However, if these EHRs are directly
published to the public, it would inevitably lead to serious
confidentiality problems. In reality, hospitals have confiden-
tiality agreements with patients, which strictly forbid HIS
discloses any identifiable information on individuals. In ad-
dition to that, laws such as HIPAA[3] explicitly state the
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confidentiality protection on health information, where any
sharable EHR system must legally comply with.
One approach on confidentiality protection is to remove
any identifiable information (i.e., patient’s name, SSN, etc)
of an EHR. However, adversary can still re-identify a patient
by inferring from external information. A research [14] indi-
cates that 87 percents of the population of U.S. can be dis-
tinguished by sex, date of birth and zip code. Such a combi-
nation of attributes, which can uniquely identify individual,
is defined as quasi-identifiers. If adversary has acknowledged
of these quasi-identifiers, an attacker might recognize an in-
dividual and take advantage of these clinical data. On the
other hand, we can find out most of these quasi-identifiers
have statistical meanings in clinical researches. Thus, there
exists a paradox between reducing the likelihood of disclo-
sure risk and retaining the data quality. For instance, if any
information of patient’s residence is excluded from the EHR,
it would disable related clinical partners to catch the spread
of a disease. Conversely, releasing data including total in-
formation of patient’s residence, sex and date of birth would
bring a higher disclosure risk.
De-identification is defined in [3] as a technology to remove
the identifying information such as name, SSN from the pub-
lished dataset. Specifically, it deals with the challenge men-
tioned above by protecting the data under a maximum tol-
erable disclosure risk while preserving the data of an accept-
able quality. In recent years, several typical privacy criteria
(i.e., k -anonymity [15], l-diversity [11], and t-closeness [9])
and anonymization methods (i.e., generalization, suppres-
sion and etc) have been proposed. Based on these works,
several de-identification tools (i.e., CAT, µ-Argus and sd-
cMicro) are developed to manage disclosure risk. Each tool
has its sample demonstration and some of them have been
applied on real datasets [17]. So far, some researchers [4] [6]
have evaluated some of these tools. In [4], it focus on the
technical details of the anonymization process and methods.
However, it does not present any practice on these tools.
In [6], it evaluates a comprehensive de-identification engine
using a dataset of surgical pathology reports. It analyzes
the anonymization steps optimized by the engine, but not
in a systemic way. Overall, none of these work provides an
insight about the best tool and method for de-identifying
pubished dataset. Our study focuses on a systemic way to
compare the existing tools based on experimental evalua-
tion.
We propose an experiment on our EHR database to eval-
uate the performance of each de-identification tool. Then
we find the most suitable tool for releasing EHRs by judg-
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ing the capability of minimizing data disclosure risk and the
distortion of the results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 briefly
introduces the experimented tools; Section 3 analyses the
EHR database and then lists the potential quasi-identifiers;
Section 4 introduces the design of experiment; Section 5
presents the results of experiment; Section 6 presents the
conclusion of the experiment and discusses the limitation.
2. THE EXPERIMENTED TOOLS
A number of groups [12][16][18] are actively developing
their de-identification tools, aiming to enable users publish
safer data. They have adopted different approaches which
reflect their particular interests and expertise. However, all
these tools include the same anonymization process in which
iteratively approximates a privacy criterion.
CAT
[18] is developed by a database group at Cornell University.
It anonymizes data using generalization technique [1], specif-
ically, replacing the values of quasi-identifiers into value ranges.
It provides graphical interface, which eases the operation like
adjusting the settings of privacy criterion or checking the
current disclosure risk. In terms of usability it presents the
contingency tables and density graphs between the original
and anonymous data, which gives users an intuitive way to
learn the information loss during the de-identification pro-
cess.
µ-Argus
[12] is part of the CASC project, which is partly sponsored
by the European Union. The main part of this software
is developed and fully tested at Statistics Netherlands. In
particular, it supports almost all the typical de-identification
approaches (i.e., global recoding, local suppression, PARM,
etc) which enable a variety of selections to enhance security.
sdcMicro
[16] is developed by Statistics Austria based on R, a highly
extensive system for statistical computing. It contains al-
most the same classic anonymization methods as µ-Argus.
Since R can be seen as a function and class-oriented pro-
gramming language, it offers a facility for designing and
writing functions for particular research purposes.
Table 1 illustrates a preliminary summary of the similar-
ities and differences of these tools, allowing an security spe-
cialist to have a better intuition of the techniques behind.
3. EHR DATABASE
In cooperation with the dialysis center of Kiang Whu Hos-
pital, Macau, we have implemented a system for utilizing its
EHR management. The test database consists of 1000 EHR
samples in which a total of 183 variables have been recorded.
De-identifying such a database is a challenge since a large
amount of sensitive clinical data can be involved in any com-
mon request. Supposing an organization request for a pub-
lished dataset on patients’ infectious disease histories, the
corresponding quasi-identifiers undergo the potential risk of
leaking patient’s privacy. An adversary could determine
one of the quasi-identifiers referenced to a female born on
12/04/64, sent to Kiang Whu Hospital last Friday, and liv-
ing in Taipa is exactly his neighbor. Then he could find his
neighbor has an infectious disease history of HCV.
Here, we consider a subset of the combination of the fol-
lowing variables in the database: gender, date of birth, place
of birth, province of residence, and zip code as a quasi-
identifier. Throughout this paper, we use the following no-
tations: QID = quasi-identifier, ZC = zip code, DoB = date
of birth, YoB = year of birth, DoR = district of residence,
PoB = place of birth.
For each quasi-identifier, we counted the number of dis-
tinct values in the database, which indicates the number of
anonymity sets; the number of patients sharing a specific
value that represents the anonymity set size k. We chose
quartiles as a means to indicate the value distribution of the
anonymity sets.
Table 2 shows the statistical characteristics of anonymity
set size k for various quasi-identifiers. The second column
indicates the number of anonymity sets in our database for a
given quasi-identifier. Generally, during the de-identification
process, the larger the number of distinct anonymity sets,
the less information distortion on the published dataset, be-
cause the anonymity set tends to be smaller in that case and
removing one affects little on the overall dataset. The min
and max values denote the smallest and largest anonymity
set.
According to Table 2, it is clear that some quasi-identifiers
lead to particularly high disclosure risks, because more than
half of their anonymity sets are smaller than 2, which means
a large portion of patients can be unambiguously identifiable
by that quasi-identifier. For instance, for {ZC+DoB}, we
can find that ’k=1’ is up to the 3rd quartile, which means
at least 75 percents of the patients are unambiguously iden-
tifiable by zip code and date of birth. Also, some quasi-
identifiers are weaker because their smallest anonymity set
is more than 5, such as {ZC}, {gender+DoR} and {gen-
der+YoB}. Overall, it turns out quasi-identifier that con-
tains date of birth, place of birth and year of birth are most
identifiable.
We also found that the size of anonymity sets for which
quasi-identifiers containing place of birth has a significant in-
crease between the third quartiles and max value. It means a
relatively large group of patients converge to one character-
istic. This is because most of the patients of Kiang Whu hos-
pital are Macau citizens. Consequently, patients who were
born elsewhere are of sparse distribution and more likely
to be unambiguously identifiable by their {gender+PoB} or
{ZC+PoB}. Table 2 also clearly shows that year of birth, a
reduction of date of birth, increases the de-identifiability:
the median anonymity set size for {gender+YoB} is 13,
whereas for {gender+DoB} is only 1.
Table 3 shows the actual number of patients that be-
longs to those anonymity sets, for example, for {ZC+DoB},
only two patients can be found in anonymity sets that have
k≤5. The larger the value in the columns ’k=1’ and ’k≤5’,
the larger the portion of the patients that is covered by
anonymity sets of small sizes, and the stronger the quasi-
identifier identify patients. The number indicates that {ZC+DoB}
is the strongest quasi-identifier, because almost all patients
have k=1. However, zip code alone is a weaker quasi-identifier,
because none of patients is in the first two columns.
Similarly, {gender+DoB} is a very strong quasi-identifier
mainly because date of birth poses a significant privacy risk
for nearly all the patients in our database. In this experi-
Table 1: Featuring the three de-identification tools
Tools Input Data Privacy Criterion
Anonymization
Approach
Data Evaluation
CAT Meta and microdata l-diversity, t-closeness
Generalization, Sup-
pression
Comparison, Risk
analysis
µ-Argus Meta and microdata k -anonymity
Global recoding, Lo-
cal Suppression, etc
Risk analysis
sdcMicro Database k -anonymity
Global recoding, Lo-
cal Suppression, etc
Comparison, Risk
analysis
Table 2: Anonymity set size k for various quasi-identifiers
QID: numbers of sets Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
ZC 38 9 20 25 31 51
ZC+gender 76 2 10 13 16 30
ZC+DoB 997 1 1 1 1 2
ZC+YoB 659 1 1 1 2 5
ZC+PoB 280 1 1 1 2 37
ZC+gender+YoB 804 1 1 1 1 4
ZC+gender+PoB 341 1 1 1 2 22
gender+DoB 998 1 1 1 1 2
gender+YoB 70 5 10 13 19 38
gender+DoR 14 55 62 72 77 91
gender+PoB 44 2 5 7 9 369
gender+DoR+PoB 191 1 1 2 2 67
gender+PoB+YoB 336 1 1 1 2 31
gender+DoR+YoB 398 1 1 2 3 11
gender+DoR+PoB+YoB 638 1 1 1 2 9
Table 3: Number of EHR data per anonymity set
size, for various quasi-identifiers
QID: k=1 k≤5 k≤10 k≤50
ZC 0 0 9 949
ZC+gender 0 2 179 1000
ZC+DoB 994 1000 1000 1000
ZC+YoB 418 1000 1000 1000
ZC+PoB 199 294 309 1000
ZC+gender+YoB 637 1000 1000 1000
ZC+gender+PoB 237 333 664 1000
gender+DoB 994 1000 1000 1000
gender+YoB 0 10 188 1000
gender+DoR 0 0 0 0
gender+PoB 0 57 242 294
gender+DoR+PoB 90 294 304 542
gender+PoB+YoB 240 354 575 1000
gender+DoR+YoB 134 864 989 1000
gender+DoR+PoB+YoB 435 958 1000 1000
ment, we replaced date of birth to year of birth before the
experiment.
The numbers for {ZC+gender+YoB} indicates that 63.7
percents of the patients can be unambiguously identified
by this quasi-identifier. For {gender+DoR+PoB+YoB}, it
shows that nearly half of the patients can be unambiguously
identified.
4. METHODS
In order to assess the performance of the selected de-
identification tools with our EHR database, we designed our
experiment of the following four aspects.
Selection of quasi-identifiers
Judging from Table 3, we found {ZC+gender +YoB} (de-
noted as QID1) and {gender+DoR+PoB+YoB} (denoted
as QID2) are the most representative quasi-identifiers for
this database (note that we excluded the quasi-identifiers
that contain date of birth).
Selection of privacy criteria
To ease the comparison of the tools, we provided k -anonymity
for this dataset. In this experiment, we set k to 2, which
means the minimum value of anonymity set size that is safe
for QID1 and QID2.
Dimensions of comparison
Two dimensions of comparison were identified. The first
dimension is the individual disclosure risk of the published
datasets regarding the above quasi-identifiers. An accurate
measure in terms of the individual risk on a quasi-identifier
was defined as the following formula in [7].
ξ =
1
n
K∑
k=1
fkrk (1)
For a quasi-identifier, fk denotes the size of k-th anonymity
set of the dataset; rk denotes the probability of re-identifi-
cation of a k-th anonymity set; n denotes the total number
of the records. A higher number indicates that the published
dataset undergo a higher probability of disclosing patient’s
privacy. Generally, individual disclosure risk is related to the
threshold value. Suppose that a threshold r∗ has been set
on the individual risk (see formula (1)), unsafe records are
those for which rk≤r∗. When threshold value set to 0.5, it
ensures the dataset to achieve 2-anonymity. Similarly, when
set to 0.2, it requires the dataset to achieve 5-anonymity.
The second dimension is the information loss for the pub-
lished datasets. A strict evaluation of information loss must
be based on a comparison between original dataset and pub-
lished dataset. A metric called Prec was proposed by Sweeny
in [13]. For each quasi-identifier, Prec counts the ratio of the
practical height applied to the total height of the general-
ization hierarchy. Consequently, the more the variables are
generalized, the higher the information loss. However, Prec
has been criticized not considering the size of the generalized
cells. Also, it doesn’t account for the information loss caused
by suppression method. Another commonly used metric is
DM* [2], which addresses on the weakness of Prec. But it
has also been criticized by [10] because it does not give in-
tuitive results when the distributions of the variables are
non-uniform. Therefore, these two metrics are not suitable
for this experiment.
The distribution of anonymity set size for a quasi-identifier
indeed represents the risk model of a dataset, where is fea-
sible to compare the original dataset and published dataset.
Looking into Table 2, it is clear that the anonymity set size of
{gender+PoB} (denoted asQID3) and {gender+DoR+PoB}
(denoted asQID4) has significant increase between the third
and forth quartile than other quasi-identifiers. In other
words, the individual disclosure risk has a significant de-
crease in the third and fourth quartile, which means that
quasi-identifier is more sensitive to a change in its anonymity
sets. To simplify the results, we measure the information loss
in terms of the slope of anonymity set size for each QID3
and QID4 in the third and fourth quartile. The information
loss for a quasi-identifier is:
λ =
∂R
′
∂Num
′
∂R
∂Num
=
k(n+1)
′−k(n)′
Sum
′
k(n+1)−k(n)
Sum
(2)
Where k(n) represents the anonymity set size at the n-th
quartile, and Sum represents the number of distinct anonymity
sets in the dataset. The above formula usually yields a pos-
itive value. A higher number suggests a higher information
loss of the original dataset.
Principal methods used for de-identification
Although different methods for acquiring k -anonymity cri-
terion have been implemented in these tools, we present
here a broad classification depending on the main techniques
used to de-identify quasi-identifers. Specifically, we classify
anonymization methods in two categories as follows: gener-
ialization and suppression, as proposed in [8]. Other meth-
ods, which randomly replaces the values of quasi-identifiers
(e.g, adding noise), distort the individual data in ways that
sometimes results in incorrect clinical inferences. As these
methods tend to have a low acceptance among clinical re-
searchers, we decided not to apply them to the EHR database.
Generalization provides a feasible solution to achieving k -
anonimity by transforming the values in a variable to the
optimized value ranges reference to the user-defined hier-
archies. Particularly, global recording means that general-
ization performed on the quasi-identifiers across all of the
records, which ensures all the records have the same recod-
ing for each variable.
Suppression means the removal of values from data. There
are three general approaches to suppression: casewise dele-
tion, quasi-identifier removal, and local cell suppression, where
CAT applied the first approach; µ-argus and the sdcMicro
applied the third approach. For the same affected number of
records, casewise deletion always has a higher degree of dis-
tortion on the dataset than local cell suppression. In most
case, suppression leads to less information loss than gener-
alization because the former affects single records whereas
the latter affects all the records in the dataset. However, the
negative effect of missing values should be considered.
5. RESULTS
Before starting our experiment, we indexed our EHR data-
base into microdata and metadata. For instance, we mapped
7 identifiable variables in PatientRecord table to categor-
ical variables, 1 to numerical variables, 9 to string vari-
ables and removed 18 variables that were either illegal to
release(i.e., patient’s name, SSN) or irrelevant to research
purpose (i.e., time stamp, barcode).We also truncated the
value of date of birth variable into year of birth.
We started by anonymizing our dataset using µ-Argus.
First, we specified the combination of variables to be in-
spected as QID1 and QID2 with the threshold set to 1(max-
imum value of anonymity set size k, which is considered un-
safe). It should be noted that the individual risk model was
restricted in µ-Argus because there was an overlap between
the quasi-identifiers. Then the tool counted the number of
the unsafe records that are unambiguously identifiable for
each combination of variables. As suggested in the user’s
manual, the first anonymization method we applied was
global recoding. Specifically, 22 different values in place of
birth variable were equivalently generalized to 8 categories;
35 different values in year of birth variable were generalized
to 12 categories; the last digit of zip code was removed. As
shown in Figure 1, the number of unsafe records decreased
from 637 to 0 and 435 to 252, respectively for QID1 and
QID2. It is clear that global recoding significantly decreases
the risk of re-identification on QID1. However, for QID2,
252 out of 1000 patients remain to be unambiguously iden-
tifiable.
After dealing with categorical variables, we found that
micro aggregation method was not practical, because the
minimum frequency of the numeric variable is far above the
minimum requirement for safe anonymity set size. Then we
applied local suppression method to protect the remaining
unsafe records. This led to 75 values in gender variables
and 121 values in place of birth variables suppressed from
the dataset.
Following we started sdcMicro. Due to the character en-
coding issue on ODBC, we collated our dataset from Tradi-
tional Chinese to UTF-8, which resulted in character loss on
some of the values in place of birth and district of residence
variables. Then we used freqCalc function in sdcMicro to
calculate the number of unsafe records for QID2. The re-
sult shows that 411 records could be unambiguously identi-
fied by QID2, contrast to 435 in Table 3, which indicates an
inaccuracy deviation of 5.5% on QID2.
Similarly, we first applied the sdcMicro function global-
Recode to the dataset. It turns out year of birth variable
Figure 1: An overview of unsafe records for various
quasi-identifiers
Figure 2: The individual risk of the dataset for QID2
generalized to the same 12 categories, which reduced the
number of unsafe records to 244 and 254, respectively for
QID1 and QID2.
Then the function localSupp could be used to apply local
suppression method. Using the threshold value of 0.5 (to
achieve 2-anonymity as mentioned in Section IV), localSupp
was first applied to QID1. This led to a suppression of 244
values in zip code variable and 20 values in year of birth
variable. Again, calculating the number of unsafe records
for this quasi-identifier, we found that the published dataset
reached 4-anonymity and the maximum value of individual
risk decreased to 0.143. For QID2, we notice that most of
the unsafe records have re-identification risk over 0.89. With
the threshold value to 0.89, suppression of 254 values in place
of birth variable were done. We observed only 3 records with
anonymity set size k=1. Then suppression (threshold value
= 0.5) was applied, 3 values in district of residence variable
were suppressed.
The left side of Figure 2 shows the distribution of individ-
ual risk of the original dataset for QID2, while the right side
shows the result of the published dataset. It is clear that the
maximum value of individual risk decreased from 1.0 to 0.5.
After three suppressions were done, for each quasi-identifier,
the dataset satisfied 2-anonymity.
The third tool was CAT. As the tool restricts one quasi-
identifier per anonymization process, we specified two quasi-
identifiers respectively. Since CAT doesn’t provide k-anony-
mity directly, we choose t-closeness criteria instead. We first
provided t-closeness criteria on the QID1 with a threshold
Figure 3: The individual risk of the dataset for QID1
Table 4: Two dimensions of comparison for various
quasi-identifiers
Maximum level CAT sdcMicro µ-Argus
ξ for QID1 0.149 0.143 0
ξ for QID2 0.402 0.500 0.384
λ for QID3 3.600 2.028 1.682
λ for QID4 86.631 3.261 1.783
value t to 0.5, which means the maximum value of individ-
ual disclosure risk is 0.5. This led to generalization method
applied to year of birth and zip code variables. Specifically,
every ten values in zip code variable were generalized into
one category, which addressed the same effect on the pub-
lished dataset as a truncation of the last digit of this variable;
every two values in year of birth variable were generalized
into one category.
As the left side of Figure 3 shows, the current maximum
value of individual disclosure risk is 0.5. After deleting 58
records, the maximum value decreased to 0.18. Looking into
the right side of Figure 3, which presents the distribution of
individual disclosure risk of QID1 on the published dataset,
we found that less than 20 percents of the records have the
risk above 0.1 and 2-anonymity was reached.
We then provided the t-closeness criteria with a thresh-
old value t set to 0.978 on QID2. This led to generaliza-
tion method applied on year of birth variable, place of resi-
dence variable and place of birth variable. In particular, the
values in place of residence variable were mapped into one
category. The values in year of birth variable were equiva-
lently mapped to 12 categories. The values in place of birth
variable were equivalently mapped to 5 categories. After
removing 57 records, the maximum value of individual risk
decreased to 0.15.
For each quasi-identifier, these de-identification tools were
able to publish the EHR dataset that satisfy 2-anonymity.
We then analyzed the published datasets in terms of two
aspects: individual disclosure risk and information loss.
Here we calculate the individual disclosure risk ξ of all
published dataset using formula (1). Table 4 indicates that
µ-Argus has produced safer dataset than the others because
it could protect patient’s privacy under the lowest maxi-
mum individual risk for both quasi-identifiers. In particu-
lar, all records in the dataset produced by µ-Argus satisfy
2-anonymity for QID1. Following, we evaluated each pub-
lished dataset in terms of their information loss λ (see for-
mula (2)). Since CAT generalized all the values in the place
of residence variable into one category, it led to a signifi-
cant information distortion on QID4. In contrast to CAT
and sdcMicro, µ-Argus takes the lowest information loss for
both quasi-identifiers to reach 2-anonymity.
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our study compared three de-identification tools that are
available for researchers to publish dataset using anonymiza-
tion techniques. We first introduced the features of each
tools, the anonymization methods behind, and the privacy
criteria adopted. Following, we analyzed the EHR database
in terms of two categories: anonymity set size k and number
of EHR data per anonymity set size for 15 quasi-identifiers.
We found quasi-identifiers that contain place of birth vari-
able and year of birth variable are most identifiable. Then
we selected two quasi-identifiers to be observed and anonym-
ized. We also include two formulas, based on which the
published dataset of each tool can be examined in two di-
mensions: individual disclosure risk and information loss.
For each tool, we outlined the anonymization process and
provided 2-anonymity. Finally, we calculated the informa-
tion loss and individual risk of each published dataset. As
µ-Argus produced the safest records and caused the lowest
information loss among these tools, it is the most suitable
de-identification tool for anonymizing our EHR database.
Numerical methods are proposed to anonymizing quasi-
identifiers from disclosing individual’s sensitive information.
However, some methods such as masking, sampling were not
implemented in these de-identification tools. Therefore, we
are not able to evaluate the effectiveness of these methods
on our EHR database.
Besides the results show the performance, it indicates the
difference of each tool on the algorithm of optimizing gen-
eralization steps. For instance, 254 values in place of birth
variable were suppressed in sdcMicro, while all the values
were generalized to 8 categories in µ-Argus. As µ-Argus
generalized more variables than sdcMicro, it benefits less
records being suppressed, and the statistical meanings of
these variables can be preserved. This also shows a specialty
on our experiment that generalization causes a lower infor-
mation loss than suppression when the latter takes certain
percents of the total records. Consequently, as applied to
our EHR database, generalization method are more suitable
than suppression method.
For the purpose of comparison, we consider k -anonymity
as the only privacy criteria, which might lead to attribute
disclosure problem on patient’s clinical data. Since there
is no de-identification approach applied to clinical variables
(i.e. infectious disease, blood type in PatientRecord ta-
ble), an attacker can discover a patient’s clinical information
when there is a little diversity in those clinical variables.
Such problems are planned to be solved in the future devel-
opment of de-identification component of our project.
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